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PART II.

We now resume the consideration of Rylands v. Fletcher
with which the last paper closed.
In this case the defendant built a reservoir upon his premises
in order to obtain a supply of water for his mill. In the
course of the construction of the reservoir five old shafts
running vertically downward were discovered. Three at least
were timbered, and all were filled with soil such as surrounded
The arbitrator who found the facts, reported that
them.
neither the defendants nor any of their employes knew or
suspected that these shafts had originally been made for the
purpose of mining the coal under the land on which they
built their reservoir. It may be noted in passing, that it seems
rather strange that the use once made of these shafts should
not have been even suspected in a place like Lancashire, as men
do not ordinarily dig deep holes in the ground and timber the
sides for no purpose save to fill them up again. However, the
case as stated, finds that the defendants, personaly, had no
knowledge or suspicion of the purpose for which these shafts
had been sunk; and further, what is certainly more reasonable,
7
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that they did not know of, or suspect* the connection between
these shafts and a series of underground workings long since
abandoned, which finally led into the plaintiff's colliery.
The r'eservoir itself'was properly constructed by competent
engineers and contractors, but it seems to be admitted (see
opinion of Bramwell, B., 3 H. & C. 791, and Lord Cairns, L.
R. 3"H. L. 338,) that they did not exercise, so far as they were
concerned, reasonable care and caution in taking notice of the
old shafts on the reservoir site. When the reservoir had been
finished it was partially filled with water, but in a Week's time
one of the shafts in the bottom gave way and the water flowed
out of the reservoir into the .shafts and through the.underground coal-working to the plaintiff's colliery which was
flooded and consequently abandoned.
It being admitted that the defendant was personally entirely
free from fault, the ordinary rule of law vould be that the
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff beyond that of reasonable care, which would be a question for the jury; but the
decision went. upon the ground that a man dealing with a
dangerous thing like a reservoir should be held to a stricter
rule; that of insuring, safety to his neighbor and thus the
Court substituted an absolute duty instead of a fluctuating
standard of prudence:
The Court of Exchequer Chamber, per Blackburn, J., gave
judgment for the plaintiff on the following ground: ".We
think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his
own purpose, brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his
peril, and if he does not do so is, prima aci, answerable, for
all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
He can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing
to the defendant's fault; or, perhaps, that the escape was the
consequence of vis major, or the act of God; but as nothing
of this sort exists here it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse
would be sufficient."
The duty of insuring safety is a heavy burden and bears
hardly on the innocent. It is, therefore, not surprising that
Fletcher v. Rylands has not been uniformly followed in
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America, and even in England numerous exceptions have been
made by the Courts. Thus, in Nichols v. Marsland, L. R.
io Ex. 255, 2 Ex. D. i, an extraordinarily violent rain storm
broke down the defendant's embankment or dam and' the
resulting damage was held to be the act of God. And in
Carstairs z. Taylor, L. R. 6 Ex. 217, a rat gnawed a hole in a
water tank and the water damaged the plaintiff's goods.
Kelly, C. B., said the accident was due to vis major.
Now, it may readily be said that the act of the defendant in
Sanderson's case comes precisely within the terms of the rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher. The water in Rylands' reservoir
flowed there naturally; it was not "brought" there but merely
allowed to accumulate. See 3 H. & C. 786, where the statement is made in argument. So little importance is attached to
this fact that neither the reporters' statement or the judges'
opinions mention it. So the coal company certainly did bring
or accumulate on their land a thing, to wit: Acid and
polluted mine water, which was likely to do mischief if it
escaped, and, therefore, in the language of the rule, was at his
peril, bound to keep the mischievous thing in bounds. Indeed,
as the judgment of the Court said, that is so, whether the
mischievous things were beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.
And the illustration of the damage done by the filth in a
neighbor's cess-pool, which poisons the water of a well, is very
close to the case of the pollution of a water course by means
of mine water.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the illustration used in the
judgment of the Court assimilated too closely the case at bar
to the case of an ordinary nuisance. Pollution of air or water
is a nuisance and (so far as occurs to the writer) nothing else,
and a nuisance is something well known to the law and
governed by familiar rules. The damage in Rylands v.
Fletcher was certainly.not a nuisance and the rule laid down in
it could not have been intended as a general rule for cases of
nuisance, except so far as to indicate that the defendant, on
account of the hazardous nature of his operations on his land,
undertook and would be held to the obligation of an insurer,
just as he who commits a nuisance is bound to indemnify his
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neighbor against the consequences, it being no answer in either
case to say that due diligence has been .observed.
The duty enforced in Rylands v. Fletcher is a duty, not only
to guard against doing damage through the exercise of due care
and diligence, but, in certain cases, absolutely to prevent it by
using sufrient care. But under what circumstances is this duty
imposed? Almost anything which a man can bring on his
land or accumulate there will do mischief if it escapes. If it
,besaid that the rule is only intended to apply to cases where
the thing brought on the land is of such a charadter that
there is danger of its breaking loose and danger of its doing
harm if it does so; then the question would seem to be rather
.a question of the degree of care or diligence to be employed
-inpreventing its escape, and thus to be determined by the
-negligence of the defendant. Perhaps, it can only be said that
-where the act of the defendant is manifestly likely to cause
-damage, a stricter rule is expedient and the defendant will not
be allowed to gay he used reasonable care or due diligence;
-where, from tte. nature -of the case, to quote the language of
'Pollock on Torts, the judgment of fact is consolidated into an
unbending rule of law. '
Now the difficulty which exists in each. case when the
question of negligence is submitted to a jury is certainly not
less than in formulating such a principle. It amounts merely to
saying that while negligence is the absence of care according
to the circumstances, the omission or commission of an act
which a prudent and reasonable man would or would not do:
yet that the' Court has the right to say on a given state of
facts, that no prudent or reasonable man would have acted .in
such a ivay. Or, as a court cannot send a case to a jury on evidence disclosing to the judicial mind no proof of negligence; so
a jury will not be allowed to find the defendant guiltless of
negligence which the judicial mind thinks -was proved.
The rule laid down by Blackburn, J., according to which
the liability of the defendant grovs out of his having or keeping a dangerous thing on his land, does not appear to have
been entirely satisfactory to the Lord Chancellor (Cairns), for,
,although he quotes with apparent approval the judgment of
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Blackburn, J., he substitutes an entirely different rule of his
own, in which the criterion of liability is said to be the natural
or non-natural user of his land by the defendant. Perhaps
the Lord Chancellor noticed and attempted to amplify a
passage in Blackburn, J.'s judgment, in which he speaks of
the defendant "having brought something on his own property
which was not naturally there," but the idea of natural use of
the land is avowedly the Lord Chancellor's own. Indeed, it
might almost seem as if he regarded the case as involving only
a special rule respecting adjacent land owners, (see Carstairs
v. Taylor, L. R. 6 Ex. 223, where one of the judges distinguished the case on that ground) but the other opinions in
Rylands v. Fletcher certainly are of far wider scope.
The rule founded on the natural user of the land was thus
explained by the Lord Chancellor (L. R. 3 H. L. 330):
"The defendants might lawfully have used their close for any
,purpose for which it might, in the ordinary course of the
employment of land be used, and, if in what I miglht term thMe
naturaluser of that land there had been any accumulation of
watel either on the surface or underground, and if by the operation of the laws of nature that accumulation of water had passed
off into the close occupied by the plaintiff, the.plaintiff could not
have complained that the result had taken place." And, again,
"If the defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close,
had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a nonnaturaluse, for the purpose of introducing*into the close that
which in its natural condition was not in or upon it, for the
purpose of introducing water either above or below ground in
quantities, or in a manner not the result of any operations on
or under the land, and if, in consequence of their doing so, or
in consequence of any imperfection in the mode of their doing
so the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of
the plaintiff, then that which the defendants were doing they
were doing at their peril."
This expression, "the natural user of the land," thus appears
to be original with Lord Cairns. It was quoted with approval
by Lord Blackburn in Wilson v. Waddell, L. R. 2 App. 95,
and Brett and Cotton, L. JJ., in Iron Co. v. Kenyon, L. R.
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i i Ch. Div. 783, and applied to mining, which was said to be
a natural use or user of land.
Fletcher v. Rylands, being understood, or misunderstood,
to establish the rule that, where the owner of land goes beyond
its "natural user," or makes a "non-natural use" of it, he acts
at his peril, and is liable for the resulting damage caused to
his neighbor Without regard to any question of his negligence,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, as was pointed out by
the author of a. very thoughtful note to Robb v. Carnegie, 3 1.
A. L..R. N. S. p. 38, has gone, in Sanderson's case, to the
full extent of holding that the converse of this rule applies,
viz: that wherever the owner of' land makes a "natural use"
of his land, he is not, in the absence of negligence or malicious
intent, liable for the damage which necessarily result therefrom.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found as little difficulty
in holding that mining was the "natural use "of mining land,
as the English Court found in holding that a reservoir was
non-natural. Not only was the coal naturally in place, and
mining a "natural" use'of the land (113 Pa. pp. 145-146),
but the impurities of the Water were not "artificial," but
"natural" (pp. 145 and',155) and the discharge of the water
was by way of "natural" channels (p. 147), from the drifts,
out of which the water, by the mere force of graVity,
"naturally" flowed. -It could not well be said that.the pump
by which the shaft was kept free, was a "natural instrument,"
or the ditch from the mouth of the shaft to the brook; but it
was evident to the Court that these agents were necessary to
enable the "natural" force of gravity to act, and the owner
to make the " natural" use of his land.
Said the Court', 113 Pa. 148: "As the Water cannot be
discharged by gravity alone, -it must necessarily, as part of the
process of mining, be lifted to the surface by artificial means,
and thence be discharged through the ordinary natural channels for the draining of the country." The chain of" natural"
cauges being confessedly broken and other agents "necessarily"
employed, why does not the language of Judge Black apply
that the necessities of one man's business cannot be the
standard of another's rights in a thing which belongs to both:
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Pa. p. 298. The use of the pump is really the gist of
the case.
With great deference to the opinions of the learned judges
quoted, the writer is constrained to say that "the natural user
of land" is to him an attractive but ambiguous form of words.
It means everything or nothing. In one sense, every (lawful)
use an owner makes of his land is natural; in another, no
use can be natural which confessedly alters the condition of
things established by nature. Natural, in one sense, is merely
expedient or proper, or in accordance with what we term
human nature, as where you speak of mining being a natural
use of land, simply meaning that it is natural for the owner to
get what he can out of it. Natural, in the other sense, is
merely according to the laws of nature. If mining the coal
as the end in view, be ."natural," so blasting, pumping and
draining, as the necessary means, may with equal justice be
said to be natural also; but this employs the word in the first
sense.- The force of gravity, which makes the polluted water
flow downwards is "natural" in the second sense.
Again, if a mine owner is allowed to develope his mines
because he is making a "natural" use of his land, although
that use "naturally" results in polluting the stream which the
inferior owners use for agricultural and domestic purposes,
what becomes of the "natural use" of his land by the agriculturist? It would be hard to find any more ancient, better
recognized or "natural" use of land than that of pasturing
cattle. Why is the miner's natural use of land to be preferred
to the agriculturist's? And why is not the latter entitled to insist
on his natural use as well as the other? But the decision in
Rylands v. Fletcher really did not rest on any such criterion;
it merely concerned the liability of one who brought (or suffered to accumulate) a manifestly dangerous thing within his
control, and the Court held that such a one, when the dangerous thing escapes and does harm, must, as a matter of law,
answer for the damage.
It may be remarked, moreover, that the decision was illustrated by the cases which hold, that the owner of cattle is
bound at his peril to keep them from trespassing, and if they
24
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escape and do damage, the owner cannot show, by way of
defence, that he did all he reasonably could to keep them at
the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. i Ex.
home. (Blackburn, J., in.
279.) Yet the keeping and pasturing of domestic cattle is
most certainly a natural use of land; and this illustration is,
from Lord Cairns' point of view, most unhappy. Again, in
Rylarids v. Fletcher, the defendant built his reservoir in order
to avail himself of the water power for use in his mill: whether
it be called a reservoir or a mill dam, does not seem to be
important.. It is"a little hard to see why the owner of a "mill
site," who constructs a dam to make the water power available,
is not making as natural use of his land as the mine owner
who bores a hole in it to get coal. For these reasons, it would
seem that Lord Cairns was led to the phrase "natural user," in
view of the fact, that in the case before him, the land owner
brought on his land something which was not naturally there,
and did not intend that the kind of use had any necessary
connection with liability. Indeed, Lord Cairns' expressly
quotes the opinion of Justice Blackburn, and approved the
illustration he used as to escaping cattle, and Lord Cranworth
followed Justice Blackburn's opinion as correctly stating the
law.

With the correctness of the ruling in Rylands v. Fletcher,
we are not now specially concerned. The decision at all
events appears perfectly just on its facts, the difficulty (and -it
is a serious difficulty) is to bring the case within a general
rule which shall at once be neither too narrow nor too broad.
The following issubmitted as an attempt only, and is probably
no great improvement over the language oi Blackburn, J.
He who voluntarily brings or suffers to remain under his
'control anything likely to do mischief, if it escape, must keep
it under control at his peril. Thus stated, the rule has nothing to do with land or the method of its user. The defendant's
liability would be the same whether he kept the dangerous
thing on his land or in his pocket. If a man handles a gun
he must not let it go off; if he makes a plaything of a snake,
he must hold it fast; if he accumulates an enormous mass of
water, he must keep it in bounds. The ordinary actions of
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mankind are not fraught with danger to his fellows, and he is
only bound to conduct himself with the ordinary prudence of
a reasonable man: his extraordinary acts are subject to an
extraordinary rule, mere prudence is not enough; if he might
have in any possible way, prevented the evil, he is bound to do
so and is liable for the consequences if he does not do so.
The act of God, for which no one is responsible, is an expression which originated at a time when men had very different
ideas than at this present. We mean by it, vis major, an
unavoidable, overpowering force, rendering control impossible.
Our present purpose is merely to show that the case did
not rule Sanderson's case at all; and, secondly, that the language of Lord Cairns as to natural user of land enabled the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, not only to distinguish
Fletcher v. Rylands, but also to adopt as law the converse of
Lord Cairns' dictum, and say that no one, in the course of the
natural user of his land, is liable for damages caused thereby.
In Robb v. Carnegie, I45 Pa. 324 (1891), the question
of the natural -use of land was considered. The plaintiff was
a farmer, the defendant a neighbor, who erected coke ovens
on his adjacent land. In an action of trespass on the case it
was proved that the smoke and exhalations from the ovens
killed the vegetation. The defendant urged, amongst other
things, that he was engaged in a lawful business, had selected
a judicious location for it and operated it without negligence
or malice in a secluded place, where as few people were inconvenienced as possible, and consequently the injury was the
natural and necessary result of the development by the owner
of the resources of his land, as in Sanderson's case. A heavy
verdict was given for the plaintiff and the Supreme Court reversed on the question of damages ; while, on the merits, the
court distinguished Sanderson's case as having no application.
"The coal company," said Justice Williams, speaking of
Sanderson's case, "was using its own land in the only manner
practicable to it. The harm done thereby to others was the
least in amount consistent with the natural and lawful use of
its own. If this use was to be denied to the coal company,
because some injury or inconvenience to others was unavoid-

lO6,
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able, then the result -would be practical confiscation of the
-coal lands 'for the benefit of .householders living on lower
ground. But the-defendants " (in Robb v. Carnegie), "are
not developing the rhinerals in their land or cultivating its
surface. They have erected coke ovens -upon it and are engaged in the manufacture of coke: Their selection of this'
site, rither than some other, is due to its location and to their
convenience, and has no relation to the character of the soil,
or to the presence or absence of underlying minerals." And
the question was'left open "whether one who mines" coal or
petroleum or lead on his own land, has, by virtue of that fact
alone, a right to manufacture or refine such product on the
tract from which it was obtained under circumstances, which
would prevent its manufacture or render him liable in damages,
if he manufactured on some other tract."
Yet it would seem that a fair application of the principles of
Sanderson's case would result in an affirmative answer to this'
question. It is quite as "natural" to burn the coal and convert
it into coke as to mine it; and as natural to pollute a neighbor's farm with the fumes of 'gas as to pollute his stream with
the acid water.
Perhaps it would have been better for. the Supreme Court
in Sanderson's case to have adopted Justice Paxson's suggestion in his dissenting opinion, when the case first came before
the Court that the rule of the English cases as to riparian
rights was not adapted to the mining regions of Pennsylvania.
Indeed,the case was interpreted by the lower Court in Collins
v. Chartier's Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. p. 15 1-2, from this standpoint: "In the Sanderson case the property of the coal company could not be used without fouling the water; the great
public interests and the private rights of mining could not be
sacrificed to preserve the inferior right and interest of the lower
proprietor. The reason for the general rule failed, and the rule
was not followed."
In the very recent case of Hauick v. Pipe Line Co., Limited,
153 Pa. p. 366 (1893), the defendant transported oil in
their pipe. The oil escaped from their -pipes, percolated
through the ground and found its way into the plaintiff's
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springs and land, destroyed the fish and caused heavy damage.
The Court held, in an action for damages, that the question
was not one depending upon the negligence of the defendant,
but merely one of nuisance. The defendant argued that Sanderson's case applied, but the Court held that it did not, be,cause the oil was brought from a distance, and the injury was
not, in any sense, occasioned by the "natural and necessary
development of the land" owned by the defendant; and the
distinction was carefully drawn between a damage resulting on
one hand from such "natural and necessary development,"
and on the other hand from "the character of some business
not incident and necessary to the land or the minerals or other
substances lying within it."
In the Union Water Co. v. Enterprise Oil Co., 38 Pitts.
Leg. Journal, 159 (i89o), the Common Pleas of Beaver
county applied Sanderson v. Coal Company to the case of an
oil company, which, in pumping its oil well, brought to the
surface a large quantity of salt water mingled with the oil.
The salt water sinking to the bottom of the receiving tank by
reason of its greater gravity was allowed to flow away, finally
seeking its level in a stream, the water of which was rendered
urifit for its ordinary use. The Court, following Sanderson's
case, refused an injunction prayed for against the oil company.
The writer believes that, in Sanderson's case, substantial justice was reached in the decision. Whether the reasons are
sound is another question, and it is frequently easier to reach
a right conclusion than to give the right reason for it.
. By way of suggestion, it may be submitted: First, the
Supreme Court should have permitted it to be shown that the
custom of the mining regions established an exception to the
ordinary rule of law. There were many cases cited on the
argument to this effect, some of which are to be found in I 13
Pa. 141. A few others are: Morton v. Solambo .County, 26
Cal. 527; Stone v. Bumpus, 46 Cal. 218; Magor v. Chadwick, ii A. & E. '571; Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, and
Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N. Y. 341.
Custom is the life of law. It is founded on what the mass
of the people instinctively recognize as just and what they
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know to be .advantageous on the whole to their own interestsIf fairly proved, why may not the universal custom of the
mining regions or the oil regions establish the law for those
places, however, different that may be from the rules adapted
to a purely agricultural country? The. torrid climate of
India requires the storing up of large quantities of water for
use in dry seasons, so when the reservoir of the Zemindar of
Carvatenagarum burst and injured the railway line, Fletcher v.
Rylands was held.not to apply, and -one of the reasons given
was because the reservoir was a public necessity rn'aintained
in accordance with the universal cust6m of the country: L.
R. i Ind. Ap. 364.
It is, perhaps, worth while-though this review has already
taken more space than at first intended-to reproduce on this
point the argument made before the Supreme .Court based
upon the cases mentioned.
In Carlyon v. Lovering, x H. & N. 784, above cited, a
custom to discharge into a stream the waste product of themines in the Stannaries'was sustained. The Court said: "We
do not see that this has a tendency to destroy the, plaintiff's
land'or exclude the plaintiff from the use of the land, except
to a partial extent. We think that the custom alleged, is
sufficiently definite and is not unreasonable. It is possible.
more stuff from the-mine may come down at one time than at
another, but that does not show that the custom is bad. We
think that it is to be confined in use to the necessary working
of the mine."
In Rogers v. Brenton, io Q. B. 26, the Court recognized the
validity of a custom to take up tin mines in the following
language: "The mine is parcel of the soil, the ownership is
in the owner of the soil, but it is a parcel which to discover
and bring to the surface may ordinarily require capital, skill,
enterpi ise and combination, which, "whilein the bowels of the
earth, is wholly useless to the owner as well as to the public,
and the bringing of which into the market is eminently for the
benefit of the public. If,therefore, the owner of the soil
cannot, or will not, do this for himself, he shall not-be allowed
to lock it up from the public, and, therefore, in such case . . .
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any tinner, that is, any man employing himself in tin mining,
may secure to himself the right to dig the mines under the
land, rendering a certain portion of the produce to the owner
of the soil." And the Court, though styling this custom "a
strong invasion of the rights of ownership," said: "There
can be no doubt that it is most reasonable, fulfilling every
requisite of a good custom."
In California precisely similar reasoning has been adopted.
In that State the public interests depended upon the development of the gold mines, which constituted a large portion of
the natural resources of the country. The courts there have
always recognized the fact that the mining customs, which
originated from the exigencies of the case, were valid as
prescribing the rules of mining in particular localities. They
were necessary, because in no other way could mining be
carried on successfully. They were proper and reasonable,
because established by those who were most competent to
decide the question. Any one who discovered a lode or vein
of ore located it by posting a notice on his claim. That gave
him a title against everybody else. In minor points every
locality had its particular usage, and these were always
sustained. In Morton v. Salambo Co., 26 Cal. 527, it was
held that where any local mining customs exist, controversies
affecting a mining right must be solved and determined by the
customs and usages of the bar or diggings embracing the
claim to which such right is asserted or denied, whether such
customs and usages are written or unwritten. In another case
the local custom of the diggings required every man to work
his claim two days in every ten, from May to November.
Failare to do so worked a forfeiture of the claim: Packer v.
Heaton, 9 Cal. 568; Strang v. Ryan, 46 Cal. 33; St. John
v. Kidd, 26 Cal. 264. So, in Colorado, in the early settlement
of the territory the location of mining claims was regulated by
the local usages and customs of the district: Sullivan v.
Hense, 2 Col. 424. 'These mining customs acquire validity
from the acquiescence, of the people: Harvey v. Ryan, 42
Cal. 626. The miner's right comes from the mere appropriation of the claim, made in accordance with the mining rules

THE NATURAL

USE OF LAND.

and customs of the -vicinage: Gore v. McBrayer, 18 Cal582; Colman v. Clements, 23 Cal. 245. The law is the samein Nevada: Oreamuno v. Uncle Sam Co., i Nev. 215;
Mallett v. Uncle Sam, i Nev. i88.
This question has also been considered in the SupremeCourt of the United States. Mr. Justice Field, in Atchison v.
Peterson, 20 Wall, 507, stated the law very clearly on page
51o: . "By the custom which has obtained among miners in
the Pacific States and Territories,. where mining for theprecious metals is had on public lands of the United States,
the first appropriator of.mines, whether in placers, veins, or
lodes, or of water in the streams on such lands for mining
purposes, is held to have a better right than others to work
the mines or use the waters." "As respects the use of waterfor mining purposes, the doctrines of the common law,
declaratory of'the rights of riparian owners,'were, at an early
day, after the discovery of gold, found .to be inapplicable, or•
applicable only in a very limited extent, to the necessities of'
iiners, and inadequate to their protection." After stating the
custom in the Pacific States as to appropriation of the streams
for mining purposes, Mr.. Justice Field says: "So the miners
on the public lands throughout the Pacific States and
Territories, by their customs, usages and regulations, everywhere recognized the inherent justice of this principle, and the
principle itself was at an early period recognized by legislation.
and enforced by the courts in those States and Territories:
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 14o."
In Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, the reasonableness of the
use of a stream by the upper riparian owner w s held to be. a
question of fact, to determine which testimony, showing the
uniform usage of the country, was admissible. The offer in
that case was to show that it had been the universal and
uniform custom and practice to discharge the spent bark of
tanneries into the streams on which they were situated ever
since the country was first settled, and that dam owners
situated below on the streams had never, so far as witnesses
knew, disputed the right to do so until now; that tanneries
could not be conducted at any profit without that means of
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III

disposing of their spent bark, 'nd that the withholding such
use of the stream from tanners would have excluded that
branch of industry from the State; and that the same custom
and practice had uniformly prevailed in all the States of New
England. It was admitted by defendant that, prior to I844,
there was no tannery on this particular stream and this suit
was brought about ten years afterwards. Judge Redfield said,
the question "must be determined upon general principles
applicable to the entire business of tanning, and the importance
of discharging its waste materials in this mode and the
probable inconvenience of those below ....
It seems to me the
uniform custom of the country for generations would be of
some significance in determining its reasonableness. A uniform
general custom upofi this subject ought, upon general
principles, to have a controlling force."
An analogous custom in booming logs is considered in
Saunders v. Clark, io6 Mass. 331.
And in Stone v. Bumpus, 46 Cal. 218, a local custom was
allowed to be shown by which the owner of a mining claim,
comprising the bed of a caion, was allowed to erect a dam
across the bed of the caion to enable him to work the same,
even if other mining claims on the same caion of subsequent
location became thereby flooded.
Custom, in this sense, is merely the tacit recognition of the
general advantage or necessity of certain things usually done,
and which the common sense of the neighborhood recognizes
as proper and right. It is probably some such thought which
underlies the expression " the natural user of the land," because whatever, is usual and customary; that which "everybody does" becomes, in a sense, natural. Plowing is not a
" natural " use of land in that the natural character of the land
is destroyed, but it is natural in that everybody knows that if
agriculture is to be carried on at all, that is the way to do.
Yet the plowing of land and the cutting down of trees to permit plowing to be done may, and often does, result in serious
changes in the character of the streams. The Zemindar's
reservoir was "natural" in India because authorized by custom, and, as was said "the only possible mode of natural use."
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But in England the conditions of life were so different that
Rylands' reservoir was merely an unusual structure threatening
extraordinary danger.
In the -second place; it was urged with some confidehce, before the Supreme Court, that Sanderson's case involved at most
-aquestion of nuisance and was to be governed by the rules
applicable to that branch of the law. The language of Lord
Cransworth was quoted from St. Helen's Smelting Company v.
Tipping, i i H. L. 642: " I well remember trying a case in
the county of" Durham, where there was an action for injury
arising from smoke in the town of Shields. It was proved
incontestably that smoke did come and, in some degree, interfere with a certain person, but I said: ' You must not look at
it with a view to the question whether abstractedly that
quantity of smoke was a'nuisance, but whether it was a nuisance to a persbn living in the town of Shields.'"
And so, in Pennsylvania, the above. language was quoted
with approval in Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 287; and again
in Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. io2. In the latter case
the Court said: "The properties of the plaintiff and defendant
lie adjoining each other on the hillside overlooking the city,
whose every-day cloud of smoke from thousands of
chimneys and stacks hangs like a pall over it, obscuring it
from sight. This single word describes the characteristics 'of
this city; its kind of fuel; its business the habits of its people and the industries, which give it prosperity and wealth.
The people who live in such a city or within its sphere of influence do so- of choice, and they voluntarily subject themselves to its peculiarities and its discomforts for the greater
benefit-they think they derive from their residence or their
business there."
If,then, a nuisance is a question, not only of the thing
done, but of the place where and circumstances under which
it is done; if persons in a populous manufacturing town have
to put up with poisonous vapors, why should not persons in
Scranton have to make the best of it when the surface streams
are polluted by the drainage from mines, from the lik.e of which
the whole neighborhood has derived its wealth and prosperity?

